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Abstract
We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in
which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action
profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a per-
fect equilibrium, as players become increasingly patient. There are two conditions:
admissibility and joint rationality. An admissibly feasible payoff can be achieved
by an action profile that offers no unilateral deviation which is both undetectable
and profitable. It is jointly rational if for all weights on players, the weighted payoff
is greater than or equal to the minmax level of the weighted payoff function. This
characterization is alternative to the one provided by the “score method” of Fuden-
berg and Levine (1994). We provide a simple construction of equilibrium strategies
based on cooperation, punishments and rewards. Punishments rely on Blackwell’s
approachability algorithm.
∗CNRS and Paris School of Economics, 75014 Paris, France, marie.laclau@psemail.eu.
†HEC Paris and GREGHEC, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France, tomala@hec.fr. The authors thank Lu-
dovic Renou and Juuso Toikka for useful discussions and comments. Marie Laclau gratefully acknowledges
the support of the French National Research Agency, under grant ANR CIGNE (ANR-15-CE38-0007-01)
and through the program Investissements d’Avenir (ANR-10–LABX_93-0). Tristan Tomala gratefully
acknowledges the support of the HEC foundation.
1
1 Introduction
Analyzing long-term relationship between rational agents is the task of the theory of
repeated games with patient players. The existence of efficient equilibrium outcomes has
been recognized quite a while ago, e.g. by Aumann and Shapley (1976, re-edited in 1994),
and it is now common language to call “Folk Theorem” the statement asserting that in the
long-term repeated game, all feasible and individual rational payoff profiles are sustained
by equilibria. A seminal work is the one by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) who proved
the Folk Theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games with high
discount factor.
Those early works rested on the assumption that action profiles are publicly and
perfectly observable. This restriction is quite demanding and imperfect observation (or
monitoring) structures appear naturally in oligopoly or moral hazard models (see e.g.
Stigler 1964, Green and Porter 1984). Most of the modern theory of repeated games
with imperfect monitoring is built on the tryptic Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990),
Fudenberg and Levine (1994) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), who studied
perfect public equilibria (henceforth PPE) of repeated games with public monitoring.
Fudenberg and Levine (1994) defined the score in a direction of the payoff space, as
the highest payoff in that direction that can be implemented by a Nash equilibrium of
the one-shot game complemented with transfers contingent on public information. The
score upper bounds the set of equilibrium payoffs in all directions, and using the dynamic
programming methods of Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990), it also characterizes the
limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor grows. Fudenberg, Levine and
Maskin (1994) obtain a Folk Theorem by finding conditions under which the set described
by the score is the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs.
The goal of the present paper is to revisit repeated games with public monitoring using
the approach of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). That is, we give a characterization of limit
equilibrium payoffs through two conditions which generalize feasibility and individual
rationality. Then, we provide constructions of perfect equilibria made of cooperation,
punishments and reward phases.
Preview of main results. More precisely, we consider PPEs of repeated games with
pure strategies, compact actions sets and deterministic public signals. We first isolate
two necessary conditions generalizing feasibility and individual rationality. An action
profile is admissible if no player can profitably deviate by an undetectable deviation
which leaves the public signal unchanged. A payoff profile is admissibly feasible if it is in
the (closure of the) convex hull of payoffs generated by admissible action profiles. Next,
for each positive weights system on players, we define the weighted minmax level as the
minmax of the weighted sum of the players’ payoff functions. The minimum is taken
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over admissible actions profiles, whereas the maximum is taken over the set of profiles
of unilateral deviations which induce the same public signals across deviating players. A
payoff profile is then said to be jointly rational if for any system of positive weights, the
weighted payoff is no less that the weighted minmax level. We show that for each discount
factor, any PPE payoff is admissibly feasible and jointly rational.
Second, under a non-empty interior condition, for any payoff profile v in the interior of
the admissibly feasible and jointly rational set, we construct a PPE whose payoff is very
close to v (for high enough discount factor). The construction can be sketched as follows.
There is a (standard) main phase where the target payoff is approximated by a cycle of
admissible action profiles. When the observed public signal is not the one prescribed, a
punishment block starts. At the beginning of this phase, for each player i we compute
the maximal payoff compatible with the observed signal and a unilateral deviation of
this player. Each player for which there is such a unilateral deviation, is assigned a
weight which is proportional to his maximal average gain from the deviation, relative to
other players, and averaged over the past stages. The weighted minmax action profile is
then played. The fact that this procedure actually punishes deviations is a consequence of
Blackwell’s (1956) approachability theorem. It remains to incentivize players to implement
the punishment block. This is done through rewards as in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
A punishment block during which a new deviation is recorded is followed by another
one. When a punishment block where no deviation is recorded occurs, a compensation
block is played where the payoffs are pushed upwards by an amount that is negatively
proportional to the number of deviations recorded in the previous-to-last punishment
block. This ensures that no player is willing to add an additional deviation within a
punishment block. Finally, after the compensation block, a reward phase is played where
the continuation payoffs of players who were not potential deviators is augmented by a
bonus ρ > 0.
The nature of the contribution. In order to place our work within the literature,
let us start by commenting on the main assumption of the paper: the consideration of
pure strategies and deterministic signaling function. To a standard finite game with a
stochastic signaling function, as in Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), we can associate
the game whose compact actions sets are the mixed actions of the original game and the
deterministic function maps a profile of mixed actions to the distributions of signals. Thus,
our assumption is similar to the observability of mixed actions that was in Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) and Benoit and Krishna (1985). To motivate this assumption, think
of the discounted game as a discretization of a game in continuous time over the time
interval [0, 1]. The higher the discount factor, the quickest players change actions. In
the continuous time limit, one can argue that it is impossible to observe which signal
occurred at each time, but that the statistical distribution over a small time interval
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is accessible. On a technical side, the stochastic process of actions induced by a time
dependent mixed action profile is ill-defined in continuous time. This problem disappears
when one views mixed actions as deterministic pure strategies in a compact set. This
is the approached followed in the recent literature on continuous time stochastic games
(initiated by Neyman, 2012).
The equilibrium payoffs of the games with observable signal distributions or observable
signal realizations are not comparable at the outset. Yet, we can show (see Section 4)
that the set of admissibly feasible and jointly rational payoffs contains all the equilibrium
(PPE) payoffs of the game with observable signal realizations. Thus, our conditions
are necessary also without assuming observability of signal distributions. This latter
assumption is important for the sufficiency part and in our equilibrium construction.
This being said, we view our contribution as two-fold. First, rather than insisting
on finding sufficient conditions for the Folk Theorem, we display necessary conditions
which show the limitations that an imperfect monitoring structure imposes on equilibrium
payoffs. We attempt at finding conditions that are more transparently readable from the
game and the monitoring structure, than those imposed by the score function. This
effort is also found in Hörner et al. (2014) where an alternative definition of the score is
given, through the dual of the optimization problem defining it. As a matter of fact, in a
direction of the payoff space with all coefficients non-positive, one can see from Hörner et
al. (2014) that the score corresponds to the weighted minmax level. In other directions,
the score is more difficult to interpret.
Second, the sufficiency part relies on “simple” strategy constructions rather than on
recursive methods. In a sense, our work revisits Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)
with the lenses of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). Notice that, even with our assumption
of pure strategies and deterministic signals (i.e. observable signal distribution), the score
method would apply routinely.
Our approach is similar in nature to the one used for time-average undiscounted games.
Among others, Lehrer (1990) obtained a characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs for
signals with a product structure (semi-standard), Tomala (1998) considered undiscounted
games with public signals and pure strategies, and Renault and Tomala (2004) character-
ized mediated communication equilibria. In these two latter papers were introduced the
condition of joint rationality and punishments using Blackwell’s approachability were de-
signed. One should note that subgame perfectness is not an issue for undiscounted games,
it is enough to restart the equilibrium strategies at very distant times to make sure that
each player neglects the cost of punishing. The present paper aims at obtaining charac-
terizations and equilibrium constructions that resemble those results, but which applies
to perfect equilibria of discounted games. The difference can be seen in the construction
using rewards, but also in the characterization. First, in equilibrium, action profiles have
to be admissible, even off-path. Second, the notion of admissibility is more stringent for
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discounted games, than for undiscounted games (even in pure strategies). There, small
gains from deviations can be tolerated, as long as they vanish to 0 in the long-run.
In a recent discussion paper, Sugaya (2016), obtains a characterization of perfect equi-
libria of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring and mediated communication.
The project is similar to ours in motivation: characterize the limit set of equilibria and
show the limitations imposed by a given monitoring structure. Sugaya shows how to
amend the set obtained by Renault and Tomala (2004), in order to account for sequential
rationality in the discounted game. The setting of Sugaya is more general than ours and
does not assume observability of distributions of mixed actions. An important difference,
leaving mediated communication aside, is that Sugaya’s sufficiency part uses the score
method and thus does not provide a strategy construction akin to the one of Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, the main results are
detailed in Section 3, and some concluding remarks are discussed in Section 4.
2 The model
Consider a stage game where the set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}, each player i has a
set of actions Xi and a payoff function ui : X → R defined on the set of action profiles
X =
∏
j Xj. All action sets are assumed to be non-empty and compact, each payoff
function is assumed to be continuous. We are also given a continuous signaling function
f : X → S which maps the set of action profiles to a compact set of signals S.
The repeated game is played as follows. At each stage t = 1, 2, . . . , players choose
actions simultaneously and if xt = (xi,t)i is the action profile selected, the signal st = f(xt)
is publicly announced. The game is repeated next period. Players discount payoffs at a
common rate δ < 1, so that if {xt} is the sequence of action profiles, player i’s payoff is∑
t(1− δ)δt−1ui(xt).
The set of public histories at stage t is St−1 and we denote H = ∪tSt−1 the set of all
public histories. A pure public strategy, henceforth a strategy, for player i is a mapping
σi : H → Xi. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i induces a unique sequence of action profiles
{xt(σ)} which in turns yields a payoff for player i denoted, U δi (σ) =
∑
t(1−δ)δt−1ui(xt(σ)).
This δ-discounted game is denote Γδ. A perfect public equilibrium is a profile of strategies
σ such that after every public history h, the profile of continuation strategies σ(·|h) is a
Nash equilibrium of Γδ. We denote by V (δ) the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs,
that is the set of payoff vectors (U δi (σ))i with σ a perfect public equilibrium. This set is
non-empty as soon as the stage game admits a Nash equilibrium, which we assume from
now on. Our main interest is to characterize V ∗ = limδ→1 V (δ).
This model is almost identical to the classical setup of Fudenberg et al. (1994) except
that on one hand we allow for infinite action sets, and on the other hand we restrict our
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study to pure strategies. Note that, as far as pure strategies are concerned, the public
qualification is superfluous. Indeed, when information is public, any pure strategy is
equivalent to a public strategy, since actions are functions of the public history and of the
strategy itself (see Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Lemma 7.1.2., p. 229).
A particular case of interest is the one of a game with finite action sets, public signals,
and observable signal distributions. Consider a repeated game with finite action sets Ai,
finite set of signals R and endowed with a stochastic signaling function pi :
∏
iAi → ∆(R)
mapping action profiles to probability distributions over signals. In the corresponding
“compact” game, the actions Xi = ∆(Ai) are the mixed actions in the underlying finite
game, the payoffs are the expected payoffs, and the signaling function is the distribution
of signals induced by a profile of mixed actions. Namely, f(x) = s ∈ ∆(R) with s(r) =∑
r,a pi(r|a)
∏
i xi(ai).
3 The main results
We first describe two necessary conditions satisfied by all perfect public equilibrium
payoffs.
3.1 Admissibility
A first necessary condition for a strategy profile to be a perfect public equilibrium is
that no profitable and undetectable deviation is ever offered to players.
Definition 3.1. An action profile x is i-admissible if for all yi ∈ Xi,
f(yi, x−i) = f(x)⇒ ui(yi, x−i) ≤ ui(x).
An action profile is admissible if it is i-admissible for each player i in N .
In particular, all Nash equilibria of the one-shot game are admissible. We denote
Ai the set of i-admissible action profiles, A = ∩iAi the set of admissible profiles and V
the closure of the convex hull of payoffs associated to admissible action profiles, that is
V = u(coA). A payoff in V shall be referred to as an admissibly feasible payoff. The next
lemma states that a perfect public equilibrium must induce admissible action profiles and
a payoff vector in V .
Lemma 3.2. For each discount factor δ < 1, if σ is a perfect public equilibrium, then for
each public history h, σ(h) is admissible. Therefore, V (δ) ⊆ V.
Proof.Fix δ < 1. If there exists a public history h, a player i and an action yi such that
f(yi, σ−i(h)) = f(σ(h)) and ui(yi, σ−i(h)) > ui(σ(h)), then player i can deviate at h and
profit at the stage of deviation without affecting continuation play. This precludes σ from
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being a perfect public equilibrium. Moreover, given a perfect public equilibrium σ and
an infinite history h, we then have σ =
∑
t(1− δ)δt−1σ(ht) ∈ coA, and U δi (σ) = ui(σ) for
each player i ∈ N . Hence, V (δ) ⊆ V . 
As a simple illustration, consider the following two-player prisoner’s dilemma, with
the signaling function given by the matrix on the right-hand side:
C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
C D
C s s
D s r
with s 6= r. First, assume that this finite game is played in pure strategies. Clearly,
(C,C) is not admissible, as player 1 (or player 2) can deviate to D and increase his payoff
without affecting the public signal. As a consequence, (3, 3) /∈ V .
Second, consider the game played in mixed strategies with observable signal distribu-
tion: (C,C) is still not admissible. Now, for x, y ∈ [0, 1], identify x (resp. y) with the
mixed strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) which plays C with probability x (resp. y).
The distribution of signals, identified with the probability of r, is f(x, y) = (1−x)(1−y).
Thus, for any y < 1, x 6= x′ ⇒ f(x, y) 6= f(x′, y) and similarly, for any x < 1,
y 6= y′ ⇒ f(x, y) 6= f(x, y′). If follows that any action profile (x, y) with x < 1 and
y < 1 is admissible. The set of admissible action profiles is thus dense and the clo-
sure of the convex hull of the associated payoffs V is the convex hull of the four points
(3, 3), (0, 4), (4, 0), (1, 1).
We also gather from this example that the set of admissible action profiles need not
be closed, which explains why V is defined as the closure of the convex hull of admissibly
feasible payoffs.
3.2 Joint rationality
The second necessary condition resembles and generalizes the usual individual ratio-
nality condition. Clearly, an equilibrium payoff must satisfy individual rationality, since
otherwise, a player would prefer to optimize myopically rather than abiding by the strat-
egy profile. In absence of some identifiability condition granting that detecting a deviation
entails identifying the deviator, individual rationality is not enough. If a detected devi-
ation can be ascribed to several players and if it is not possible to punish those players
simultaneously, then some feasible and individually rational payoffs, even efficient ones,
cannot be obtained in any equilibrium. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 3.3. Consider a 3-player partnership game between two agents (players 1 and
2) and a principal (player 3). The principal gets a strictly positive payoff only if he hires
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the two agents and both of them work. He gets nothing if one agent shirks or if he hires
only one of them. When both agents are hired, each of them prefers to shirk. An agent
who is hired alone gets all the surplus to himself effortlessly. The payoff table is as follows:
W S
W w − c, w − c, B w − c, w, 0
S w,w − c, 0 w,w, 0
Hire both (Hb)
W S
W b, 0, 0 b, 0, 0
S b, 0, 0 b, 0, 0
Hire 1 (H1)
W S
W 0, b, 0 0, b, 0
S 0, b, 0 0, b, 0
Hire 2 (H2)
where B is the profit of the principal when he hires the two agents and both work, w is the
wage paid to each agent, c is the cost of effort and b is the net gain of either agent when
he is hired alone. All parameters are positive. We assume w > c and B > max{2c, b}
so that (Hb,W,W ) is the only surplus-efficient outcome. Observe that the set of feasible
payoffs has non-empty interior and that the minmax level is 0 for each player, so that
each feasible payoff is individually rational.
Assume that the public signal is made of the action and of the payoff of the principal.
That is, in each period, it is announced who is hired, and when both are hired, it is known
whether both worked or not.
We claim that any equilibrium payoff v = (v1, v2, v3) satisfies v1 + v2 ≥ min{2w, b}.
As a consequence, if 2w− 2c < min{2w, b}, then the efficient outcome (w− c, w− c, B) is
not an equilibrium outcome of the repeated game, and equilibrium payoffs are bounded
away from efficiency (for a numerical instance, take e.g. w = 4, c = 3, B = 10, b = 3).
To justify this claim, take σ a perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game with
discount factor δ, and for i = 1, 2, define τi as the deviation of player i that always plays
S. The sequence of public signals is the same under (τ1, σ−1) as under (τ2, σ−2). Thus, the
sequences of actions of the principal are also the same under these two strategy profiles.
For each action of the principal a3, denote,
Nσ(a3) =
∑
t
(1− δ)δt−11{a3,t=a3},
the discounted average number of stages where a3 is played under σ. We have that for
any action of the principal a3, Nτ1,σ−1(a3) = Nτ2,σ−2(a3) := N(a3). Now, U δi (τi, σ−i) =
wN(Hb) + bN(Hi), and from the equilibrium condition vi ≥ U δi (τi, σ−i). It follows that,
v1 + v2 ≥ 2wN(Hb) + bN(H1) + bN(H2) ≥ min{2w, b},
since N(Hb) +N(H1) +N(H2) = 1. 
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To pin down the relevant participation constraint, we need conditions ensuring that
any detectable deviation be punishable, even when the deviator is not identifiable. To
this end, we borrow tools from repeated games with incomplete information (Aumann
and Maschler, 1995) and approachability theory (Blackwell, 1956). In two-player repeated
games with lack of information on one-side, the uninformed party may want to punish
the informed party in all possible states of the world. This can be done using an ap-
proachability strategy that pushes down the payoff of the informed player simultaneously
in all states. The theorem of Blackwell (1956) characterizes the payoff vectors for which
such a strategy exists. We are going to view the collectivity of players who design the
public strategy profile as the uniformed party, and the deviating player as the informed
party, the state being its identity. The derived approachability condition is precisely the
participation constraint that we need.
We consider probability distributions q ∈ ∆(N) over the set of players, which can be
seen as weights. For each such q and each action profile x, the set of non-revealing action
profiles at (q, x) is:
NR(q, x) = {y ∈ X : f(yi, x−i) = f(yj, x−j),∀i, j ∈ supp q}.
This is the set of profiles of unilateral deviations that induce the same public signal, for
each possible deviator i in the support of the distribution q. The q-weighted minmax level
is defined by the following inf-max formula:1
`(q) = inf
x∈A
max
y∈NR(q,x)
∑
i
qiui(yi, x−i).
Attach weight qi to player i and consider the weighted payoff function
∑
i qiui(yi, x−i)
where y is a profile of “deviations” which does not reveal any information about the
identity of the deviator besides that qi > 0. The number `(q) is the “minmax” of this
weighted payoff function, where the infimum is over admissible profiles, and the maximum
is over non-revealing action profiles.
Definition 3.4. A payoff vector v ∈ RI is jointly rational if for each q ∈ ∆(N):∑
i
qivi ≥ `(q).
In other words, v is jointly rational if it is “individually rational” for each vector of
weights q. We denote JR the set of jointly rational payoff vectors. The next lemma claims
that every perfect public equilibrium payoff is jointly rational.
Lemma 3.5. For each δ < 1, V (δ) ⊆ JR.
1Since A may not be closed, the minimum may not be achieved. However, NR(q, x) is compact, so
the maximum is achieved.
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Proof.Fix δ < 1. Take a perfect public equilibrium σ and let v be the associated payoff. If
v /∈ JR, there exists q ∈ ∆(I) such that for every x ∈ A, there exists y(q, x) ∈ NR(q, x)
with, ∑
i
qiui(yi(q, x), x−i) >
∑
i
qivi.
For each player i in the support of q, let τi be the strategy such that for any public
history h such that σ(h) = x, then τi(h) = yi(q, x). Since for every public history h,
(τi(h))i ∈ NR(q, σ(h)), the sequence of public signals induced by (τi, σ−i) does not de-
pend on the choice of i in the support of q. If we denote h∗ this sequence, for each i in the
support of q, (τi, σ−i) induces the sequence of action profiles {(yi(q, σ(h∗t )), σ−i(h∗t ))}. By
construction, at each stage t,
∑
i qiui(yi(q, σ(h
∗
t )), σ−i(h
∗
t )) >
∑
i qivi, and averaging over
time yields
∑
i qiU
δ
i (τi, σ−i) >
∑
i qivi. Therefore, there exists i such that U
δ
i (τi, σ−i) > vi,
which contradicts that σ is an equilibrium. 
Now, let us discuss the relationship between joint rationality and individual rationality.
The minmax level of player i is wi = minx−i maxxi ui(xi, x−i), and a payoff vector v is
individually rational if vi ≥ wi for each player i.
Lemma 3.6. Any jointly rational payoff is individually rational.
Proof.Consider q = i the dirac measure on player i. Clearly, NR(i, x) = Xi and there-
fore, `(i) = infx∈Amaxyi∈Xi ui(yi, x−i). Thus, if v is jointly rational, then for each player
i, vi ≥ infx∈Amaxyi∈Xi ui(yi, x−i) ≥ wi. 
The latter inequality says more. Due to imperfect monitoring, it may not be possible
to punish player i down to his minmax level within a perfect public equilibrium, even
when he is identified as a deviator. The reason is that, in a perfect public equilibrium,
only admissible action profiles are used, even off the equilibrium path.
Example 3.7. Consider the following two-player game:
L M R
T 4, 4 2, 2 5, 3
M 2, 2 1, 1 4, 2
B 3, 5 2, 4 6, 6
with the signaling function,
L M R
T s s r
M s s r
B w w z
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The actionM of player 1 is strictly dominated by T , and T,M are indistinguishable in that
f(T, a2) = f(M,a2) for any action a2 of player 2. By symmetry of the game, the only ad-
missible action profiles are {T,B}×{L,R}. It follows that `(1) = minx∈Amaxy1 u1(y1, x2) =
4, while minx2 maxx1 u1(x1, x2) = 2. 
The previous example shows that the definition of individual rationality level has to
be adapted to account for imperfect monitoring.
Definition 3.8. The admissible minmax level of player i is:
w∗i = inf
x∈A
max
yi∈Xi
ui(yi, x−i) ≥ wi.
A payoff vector v is admissibly individually rational if for every player i, vi ≥ w∗i .
Note that the admissible minmax level is of different nature than the various effective
minmax levels found in the literature (see e.g., Wen, 1994; Fudenberg et al. 2007). Ef-
fective minmax levels are adaptations required to tackle games with payoffs that do not
satisfy full-dimensionality. In the example, full-dimensionality is satisfied, and the modifi-
cation of minmax levels is required by purely informational considerations. Summarizing
this discussion, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9. Any jointly rational payoff vector is admissibly individually rational. There-
fore, any perfect public equilibrium payoff is admissibly individually rational.
This lemma together with Example 3.7 provide a simple example of discontinuity of
the equilibrium payoff set as δ reaches 1. For each δ < 1, payoffs have to be admissibly
individually rational, whereas with no discounting, all admissibly feasible and individually
rational payoffs can be obtained.
Example 3.7 has another feature that is worth commenting: this very signaling func-
tion allows to identify the deviator. This is the case when the signaling function has
the product structure. Precisely, this is when for each player i, there is a function
fi : Xi → Si such that f(x) = (fi(xi))i. In other words, some public information is
released about the action of each player, and the public information about player i’s ac-
tion does not depend on the actions of other players. Under this assumption, when a
deviation is detected, the deviator is identified. Indeed, if i 6= j, it is not possible to have
f(yi, x−i) = f(yj, x−j) 6= f(x). The set of jointly rational payoffs is then easily computed.
Let V∗ = V ∩ JR = u(coA) ∩ JR.
Lemma 3.10. If the signaling function has the product property, then V∗ is the set of
payoffs in V which are admissibly individually rational.
Proof.Take v ∈ V an admissibly individually rational payoff vector and consider q ∈ ∆(I)
whose support contains at least two points. The product property implies that for each
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action profile x and each y in NR(q, x), f(yi, x−i) = f(yj, x−j) = f(x), for all i, j in the
support of q. If x is admissible, then ui(yi, x−i) ≤ ui(x) and therefore,
`(q) = inf
x∈A
max
y∈NR(q,x)
∑
i
qiui(yi, x−i) = inf
x∈A
∑
i
qiui(x).
Now, each payoff vector v ∈ V is arbitrarily close to a convex combination of the form∑
k λku(xk) with xk admissible. Thus,
∑
i qivi is arbitrarily close to
∑
k λk
∑
i qiui(xk)
which is no less than `(q). As a consequence,
∑
i qivi ≥ `(q). 
To conclude this set of remarks on joint rationality, let us say a few words about
two-player games. A reasonable guess, albeit wrong, is that in a two-player game, V∗
is the set of admissibly feasible payoffs which are admissibly individually rational. The
intuition supporting this guess is the following: in the case where a deviation is detected,
each player plays a minmax strategy against the other. The problem is that, although the
mutual minmax is feasible in any two-player game, the admissible mutual minmax might
not be. In other words, there may not exist a strategy profile which is admissible and such
that both players receive at most their admissible mutual minmax. Another interpretation
of this phenomenon pertains to the public nature of the strategies. Public signals might
indicate a deviation but not the identity of the player. Suppose that player 1 deviates
once and conforms afterwards. If the signal is compatible with a deviation of player 2,
then in a perfect public equilibrium, after this history, both player act independently of
the identity of the deviator. Yet, both players would be able to compute it, were they
allowed to recall private past actions. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.11. Consider the following two-player game:
A2 B2 C2
A1 4, 4 1, 5 6, 0
B1 5, 1 0, 0 0, 0
C1 0, 6 0, 0 2, 2
with the signaling function:
A2 B2 C2
A1 s r r
B1 r r r
C1 r r s
The set of admissible action profiles is A = {(A1, A2); (C1, C2); (A1, B2); (A2, B1)}.
On one hand, any unilateral deviation from either (A1, A2) or (C1, C2) changes the signal,
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on the other hand, (A1, B2) and (A2, B1) are Nash equilibria of the stage game. For any
other action profile, the signal is r and there is a profitable deviation for either player that
does not change the signal. Therefore, V is the convex hull of the payoff vectors (4, 4),
(5, 1), (1, 5) and (2, 2). The minmax (either regular or admissible) is 1 for each player.
We claim that any perfect public equilibrium payoff v = (v1, v2) satisfies v1+v2 ≥ 6. This
implies that the admissibly individually rational payoff (2, 2) is not an equilibrium payoff
and that joint rationality constraints have to be considered to characterize perfect public
equilibrium payoffs.
To justify this claim, fix δ < 1 and consider σ a perfect public equilibrium. Necessarily,
σ(h) ∈ A for each history h. Let τi be the deviation of player i who plays Bi when
σ(h) = (A1, A2), Ai when σ(h) = (C1, C2), and conforms with σ otherwise. The sequence
of signals is (r, r, . . . ) both under (τ1, σ−1) and (τ2, σ−2). Denote x∗t the action profile
induced by σ after the history r, . . . , r in which only r appears and y∗i,t the action of
player i at stage t induced by (τi, σ−i). The point is that the sequence {x∗t} is the same
under both deviations and that for each t, u1(y∗1,t, x∗−1,t) + u2(y∗2,t, x∗−2,t) ≥ 6. It follows
that U δ1 (σ) + U δ2 (σ) ≥ U δ1 (τ1, σ−1) + U δ2 (τ2, σ−2) ≥ 6. 
3.3 The characterizations
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.12. Each payoff vector in the interior of V∗ is arbitrarily close to a perfect
public equilibrium payoff of the repeated game when the discount factor is high enough.
The proof is constructive, we adapt the construction of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
with a normal phase, punishments and rewards, the main differences being seen in the
punishment phase. An informal description is as follows.
Take a payoff profile v in the interior of V∗ such that v′ = v−10ε is also in the interior
of V∗.
(i) The main phase consists in a cycle whose repetition achieves a payoff ε-close to
v. This phase continues as long as the prescribed signals are observed. When an
unexpected signal appears, the punishment phase starts.
(ii) The punishment phase consists of two parts.
(a) First, the following approachability algorithm is used. If xt is supposed to be
played at stage t and st is the observed signal, then for each player i we let:
u∗i (xt, st) = max{ui(yi, x−i,t) : f(yi, x−i,t) = st}
be the maximal payoff of player i compatible with the observed signal and a
unilateral deviation (it is set as v′i if player i has no such unilateral deviation).
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Denote u¯∗i,t the average of the u∗i (xt, st) from the start of the punishment phase
up to stage t. We define a weight for each player i by,
qi,t =
max{u¯∗i,t − v′i, 0}∑
i∈N max{u¯∗j,t − v′j, 0}
.
Then, xt+1 is chosen such that∑
i
qi,tv
′
i ≥ max
y∈A
∑
i
qi,tui(yi, x−i,t+1).
This choice is possible since v′ is in the interior of JR.
This algorithm is derived from Blackwell’s approachability strategy. It ensures
that after a finite number T of stages, the payoff of each player is no more that
vi − 9ε. This algorithm is repeated identically for a number Q of blocks of T
stages, even if there are additional deviations during its execution. If there are
such deviations, after finishing the Q blocks of punishment, a new sequence of
Q punishment blocks starts, where the set of punished players is initialized to
be the set of the potential deviators at the last deviation.
The reason for repeating the algorithm identically Q times, is that when a
player deviates once, he may profit from the deviation at the remaining stages
of the current block only, and not at the stages of the subsequent blocks.
(b) When a block of punishment (containingQ blocks) is completed without record-
ing any deviation, a compensation block is played. Its purpose is to link the
payoff of each player who was punished in the last Q blocks, with the number
of deviations recorded in the previous-to-last Q blocks (by construction, there
was no deviation in the last Q blocks): the higher the number of deviations,
the lower the payoff during the compensation block.
As for the punishment blocks, the compensation block is completed even if ad-
ditional deviations are recorded. It also consists of a repetition of independent
copies (R blocks of length T ). Deviating in the compensation block triggers
new punishments.
Intuitively, being the first to deviate during a punishment block will make
the punishment longer (a new punishment block is added), and making an
additional deviation will lower the payoff obtained in the compensation block.
(iii) After punishments and compensation, the continuation payoffs of players who were
not potential deviators is augmented by a bonus ρ > 0.
This rewarding system is similar to the one of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) and
classically provides incentives to implement the punishments.
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The proof consists simply in verifying that no player has a profitable one-shot devia-
tion. The details are relegated to the appendix.
4 Concluding remarks
4.1 Folk Theorem
Our main result can be used to obtain sufficient conditions for a Folk Theorem. Sup-
pose that no player has undetectable deviations:
∀i, ∀x,∀yi, f(yi, x−i) = f(xi, x−i)⇒ yi = xi.
Suppose also that deviators are always identified:
∀i, j,∀x,∀yi, yj, f(yi, x−i) = f(yj, x−j)⇒ f(yi, x−i) = f(yj, x−j) = f(x).
Then for any payoff function, V∗ is the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs.
This is a simple and straightforward consequence of the definitions of admissibility and
joint rationality (the proof of Lemma 3.10 applies, with the additional property that all
actions profiles are admissible). From the examples in Section 3, it is easily seen that
these conditions are necessary. If they are not satisfied, then we can find a payoff function
for which the Folk Theorem fails.
4.2 Finite games and mixed strategies
Consider a repeated game with finite action sets Ai, finite set of signals R and with
a stochastic signaling function pi : ×iAi → ∆(R) as in Fudenberg et al. (1994). Let
E∗(δ) be the set of payoffs associated to public perfect equilibria in mixed strategies of
the δ-discounted game. Our approach gives an upper bound on this set. Precisely, let us
associate to these data a “compact” game, in which the action sets are Xi = ∆(Ai), that
is the mixed actions of the underlying finite game, payoffs are the expected payoffs, and
the signaling function f : X → ∆(R) is the distribution of signals induced by a profile of
mixed actions. Then:
Claim 4.1. For each δ, E∗(δ) is a subset of the admissible and jointly rational payoffs
V∗ of the associated compact game.
The proof of this claim is a straightforward adaptation of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.5. For
Lemma 3.2, if σ(h) is not admissible, then there exists some player who can deviate prof-
itably after history h, while inducing the same distribution of signals. Thus, continuation
payoffs are unaffected and the deviation is profitable in the repeated game. For Lemma
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3.5, we consider the same deviations τi for each player i in J , and argue that they all
induce the same distribution of signals and thus the same responses of the public strategy
profile. The rest of the proof goes through.
An important open issue is either to find conditions ensuring that E∗(δ) converges to
V∗ or to give an analogous characterization of the limit. Consider a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma with two possible public signals such that the probability of the high signal is
p < 1 when both cooperate, and is 0 < q < p otherwise. It is known that perfect public
equilibrium payoffs are bounded away from efficiency (see Radner et al., 1986; Mailath
and Samuelson, 2006, section 7.2.3). Yet, if the distribution of signals is observable, coop-
eration is possible, that is, V∗ is the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Thus,
the observation of realized signals imposes further restrictions on equilibrium payoffs.
Of course, the correct restrictions are those imposed by the score. Our work, combined
with the dual approach of Hörner et al. (2014), gives an interpretation of the score in
negative directions. Finding similar interpretations in other directions is left for future
research.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.12
Fix a payoff vector v in the interior of V∗. For each subset of players J ⊆ N , denote
vJ the payoff vector such that vJi = vi + ρ if i ∈ J , and vJi = vi otherwise, with ρ > 0
a positive reward such that each vJ is in the interior of V∗. We choose an ε > 0 such
that for each J ⊆ I, the ball with center vJ and radius 10ε is included in the interior of
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V∗. The vectors v, vJ can be approximated arbitrarily closely by convex combinations
of admissible payoffs with rational coefficients. So without loss of generality, we assume
that there exists an integer T such that v =
∑
k
T 0k
T
u(x0k), with
∑
k T
0
k = T , x0k ∈ A (∀k),
and for each J ⊆ N , vJ = ∑k TJkT u(xJk ), with ∑k T Jk = T , xJk ∈ A.
The following piece of notation is going to be useful. Given an action profile x and a
signal s, denote D(x, s) = {i ∈ N : ∃yi ∈ Xi, f(yi, x−i) = s} the set of players that are
able to induce the signal s by a unilateral deviation from x. When x is the action profile
prescribed by the strategy and s 6= f(x), then a deviation is detected and D(x, s) is the
set of potential deviators. We denote J(x, s) = N \D(x, s) the set of innocents.
We turn now to the construction of the strategy which has three kind of phases:
Normal phases NORM(w) for any w ∈ {v, vJ : J ⊆ I}, a punishment phase and a reward
phase.
Normal phase. For a vector w =
∑
k
Tk
T
u(xk), the normal phase NORM(w) consists in
playing a T -periodic sequence of action profiles where for each k, xk is played Tk times
within a period.
At stage 1, we start the main phase NORM(v), which defines a periodic sequence
of action profiles xt (and similarly for the phase NORM(w) which starts at some stage
t). Denote st = f(xt) the expected signal at stage t when xt is played and st the signal
actually observed. As long as st = st, the main phase continues to the next period. If
there is a first stage t∗ such that st∗ 6= st∗ , then the punishment phase starts at stage
t∗ + 1. The set of suspects is initialized to DP1 = D(xt∗ , st∗).
Punishment phase. This phase is decomposed in two parts, first a sequence of one or
several blocks P1, P2, etc, of stages of length P with P an integer; then, a compensation
block which aims at giving each suspected player a payoff that depends on the number of
deviations that occurred in the previous-to-last block.
(i) Punishment blocks. Each block Pk consists of Q blocks of stages of length T with
P = QT , Q being an integer. We denote xt the action profile prescribed at stage t during
this phase and st the signal actually observed at stage t. The sequence {xt} is defined
recursively. The set of deviators of the first punishment block P1 is DP1 = D(xt∗ , st∗) (the
set of deviators at blocks Pk for k > 1 are defined below). Take any block q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}.
The first action profile xt∗+1 is chosen arbitrarily in A. Suppose that x` has been defined
for all ` = t∗+(q−1)T+1, . . . , t∗+(q−1)T+t, with t < T , and that the signal s` has been
observed at stage `. For each player i and each stage ` = t∗+(q−1)T+1, . . . , t∗+(q−1)T+t,
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we define the maximal payoff of player i ∈ N at stage ` as:
u∗i (x`, s`) :=

maxyi{ui(yi, x−i,`) : f(yi, x−i,`) = s`}, if i ∈ DP1 and ∃yi s.t.
f(yi, x−i,`) = s` ;
vi − 10ε, otherwise.
This is the maximal payoff of player i compatible with the observed signal s` and a
unilateral deviation. Compute for each player i, the average maximal payoff u¯∗i,t =
1
t
∑t
`=1 u
∗
i (x`, s`) from the start of the punishment bock q up to stage t.
- If u¯∗i,t ≤ vi − 10ε, for each player i, then xt+1 is chosen arbitrarily in A.
- Otherwise, define a vector of weights q ∈ ∆(I) by:
qi =
max{u¯∗i,t − (vi − 10ε); 0}∑
j∈J max{u¯∗j,t − (vj − 10ε); 0}
,
and choose xt+1 ∈ A such that:∑
i∈J
qi(vi − 10ε) ≥ max
y∈NR(q,xt+1)
∑
i
qiui(yi, x−i,t+1).
Such an action profile exists from joint rationality and since the ball around v with
radius 10ε lies in the interior of JR. This algorithm is Blackwell’s approachability strategy.
At the stage t∗ + T , the first punishment block q = 1 ends. The same strategy is
played for Q consecutive blocks and is restarted at the beginning of each block. At the
stage t∗ + P , that is after Q punishment blocks, the block P1 ends. The strategies for
blocks Pk, for k > 1, are defined similarly with an updated set of potential deviators as
defined below. The following rule applies:
(i) If there was no deviation during the punishment block P1, i.e. for every t ∈ {t∗ +
1, . . . , t∗+P}, st = f(xt), then go to the compensation phase COMP(0,DP1) defined
below: this is the compensation phase for the case there was 0 deviation during the
initial punishment block P1 in which the initial set of suspects was DP1 .
(ii) If there was some deviation during the punishment block P1, consider the last de-
viation tˆ = max{t : t ∈ {t∗ + 1, . . . , t∗ + P} and st 6= f(xt)}. Then start a new
punishment block P2 at stage t∗ + P + 1 where the set of suspects is initialized to
DP2 = D(xtˆ, stˆ).
(iii) From (ii), this defines several punishments blocks denoted P1 from stages t∗ + 1 to
t∗ + P , and for each k > 1, Pk from stages t∗ + (k − 1)P + 1 to t∗ + kP . For each
k > 1, denote by DPk the initialized set of suspects at the punishment block Pk.
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If there exists a first k > 1 such that there is no deviation in Pk, i.e. for every
t ∈ {t∗+ (k− 1)P + 1, . . . , t∗+ kP}, st = f(xt), then go to the compensation phase
COMP(nk−1,DPk) with nk−1 the number of deviations at previous-to-last block Pk−1,
that is nk−1 = ]{t : t ∈ {t∗+ (k− 2)P + 1, . . . , t∗+ (k− 1)P} and st 6= f(xt)}. This
phase COMP(nk−1,DPk) described below is the compensation phase for the case
there was k punishments blocks, there was nk−1 deviations in the previous-to-last
punishment block, and the last set of potential suspects was DPk .
Notice that the play does not reach the compensation phase until a full punishment
block Pk, for some k, is completed without any deviation. This ensures that suspected
players are effectively punished.
(ii) Compensation block. The previous description implies that a punishment block
has to be completed before starting a new one, even if there are some deviations in the
current block (and similarly, within each punishment block Pk, each block q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} is
completed before starting a new one). To prevent players from deviating after a deviation
has been detected in a current punishment block Pk for some k, we add a compensation
block such that the payoff of each player in the set of suspects of the last punishment block,
depends on the number of deviations at the previous-to-last blocks (by construction, there
was no deviation in the last block). The higher the number of deviations, the lower the
payoff during the compensation block. Hence, intuitively, deviating during a punishment
block either makes the punishment longer (a new punishment block is added) or lowers
the payoff obtained in the compensation block.
More precisely, for each k > 0, we define the compensation block COMP(nk−1, DPk),
with n0 = 0, which lasts C stages. For each player i in N , let ri(DPk) be player i’s realized
average payoff during block Pk (this value can be computed by all players since there must
have been no deviation in block Pk in order to reach the reward phase). Define now, for
every player i ∈ N :
zi(DPk) = ri(DPk)
1− δP
δP (1− δC) .
For each subset of players J ⊆ N , denote cJ the payoff vector such that :
cJi =
 1−δ
P+C
δP (1−δC)
(
vi −
(
9 + nk−1
P
)
ε
)− zi(DPk), if i ∈ J
1−δP+C
δP (1−δC)vi − zi(DPk) otherwise.
Since ε > 0 is such that for each J ⊆ N , the ball with center vJ and radius 10ε is
included in the interior of V∗, we have that cJ is also in the interior of V∗. The vector
cJ can be approximated arbitrarily closely by convex combinations of admissible payoffs
with rational coefficients. So without loss of generality, we assume that for each J ⊆ N ,
cJ =
∑
k
TJk
T
u(xJk ), with
∑
k T
J
k = T , xJk ∈ A, and T is the same as defined before (first
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paragraph of Appendix A).
The strategy of the players during phase COMP(nk−1, DPk) is then to play cyclically
the sequence of actions x
DPk
k for k ∈ {1, . . . , T}, which gives the vector payoff cDPk to the
players until a new possible deviation. If there is a deviation at some stage, then players
finish the compensation block COMP(nk−1, DPk) and then start a new punishment phase.
Otherwise, players go to the reward phase at the end of the compensation block. Let
C = RT with R an integer representing the number of cycles in the compensation phases.
Intuitively, this compensation block is such that suspected players in any punishing
block have no incentive to deviate, otherwise they would only either lengthen their pun-
ishment (if this is the first deviation of the block) or increase nk−1 and therefore lower cJ
by ε
P
.
Reward phase. In order to provide each innocent player (who is not in the set of
suspected players at some punishment block) with an incentive to play his Blackwell
strategy during the punishment block, an additional bonus ρ > 0 is added to his average
payoff. If the discount factor is large enough, the potential loss during the punishment is
compensated by the future bonus. The possibility of defining such rewards relies on the
fact that v is in the interior of V∗ as in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). The strategy of
the players during this reward phase is then to play NORM(vDPk ) until a new possible
deviation. If there is a deviation at some stage, then players start a new punishment
phase.
The description of the strategy is now complete.2 Next, we prove that it has the
desired properties for appropriate choice of the parameters.
The equilibrium verification. We prove now that this strategy profile is a perfect
public equilibrium for high discount factor and suitable choice of the parameters M , T ,
Q and R.
Remark first that the induced payoff is close to v when the discount factor is high.
Indeed, since the main phase is cyclic, the discounted payoff under this profile is:
∑T
t=1
1− δ
1− δT δ
t−1u(xt),
which converges to (1/T )
∑T
t=1 u(xt) = v as δ → 1. More precisely, we let M =
maxx∈X(
∑
i ui(x)
2)
1
2 . For each α > 0, we can choose δ high enough so that:
∑P
t=1
∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δT δt−1 − 1T
∣∣∣∣ ≤ αM .
2If at some stage, D(xt, st) = ∅, that is, if signals indicate a multilateral deviation, the strategy
prescribes a fixed Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game at all subsequent stages.
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Thus, for any sequence {xt},∣∣∣∣∑Tt=1 1− δ1− δT δt−1u(xt)− 1T ∑Tt=1 u(xt)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ α.
Notice also that the same approximations hold for the punishment and compensations
phases. Since P is a multiple of T , thus the discounted payoff over a block of length
P = QT can be written as,
∑Q
q=1
1− δT
1− δTQ (δ
T )q−1
∑T
t=1
1− δ
1− δT δ
t−1u(xt+(q−1)T ).
This is α close to the discounted sum of arithmetic averages,
∑Q
q=1
1− δT
1− δTQ (δ
T )q−1
∑T
t=1
1
T
u(xt+(q−1)T ).
The same holds for blocks of size C, since C is a multiple of T as well. We choose from
now on an approximation error α << min{ε, ρ}, very small with respect to ε and ρ.
The next claim shows that each punishment block is effective and is based on ap-
proachability arguments.
Claim A.1. Assume that a punishment block starts at stage t∗+ 1. The average maximal
payoff of each player j at stage t∗ + t ≤ t∗ + T satisfies,
u¯∗j,t ≤ (vj − 10ε) + 2M/
√
t
with M = maxx ‖u(x)‖ and ‖.‖ is the Euclidean norm on RN .
The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the one of Blackwell’s (1956). Since it is
quite simple, we provide it for the sake of completeness.
Proof.Let u¯∗t be the vector (u¯∗j,t)j ∈ RN and let C = {w ∈ RN : wj ≤ vj − 10ε}.
Endow RN with the usual inner product and the corresponding Euclidean norm, and
remark that the projection of u¯∗t onto the convex and closed set C, is the vector pi(u¯∗t ) =
(min{u¯∗j,t, vj − 10ε})j. Thus, the vector of weights q is the normalization of the vector
u¯∗t −pi(u¯∗t ) = (max{u¯∗j,t− (vj− 10ε), 0})j. If u¯∗t does not belong to C, then the hyperplane
orthogonal to q which contains pi(u¯∗t ), separates u¯∗t from C. Now, xt+1 is such that for all
y ∈ NR(q, xt+1),
∑
j qj(vj − 10ε) ≥
∑
j qjuj(yj, x−j,t+1). In particular, since x ∈ NR(q, x)
for any x, the payoff vector u(xt+1) is separated from u¯∗t by this hyperplane. Under a
one-shot deviation, the next vector of maximal payoffs u∗t+1 = u(xt+1) is also separated
from u¯∗t by the hyperplane. Then,〈
u¯∗t − pi(u¯∗t ), u∗t+1 − pi(u¯∗t )
〉 ≤ 0.
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Define now Dt as the distance between u¯∗t and C. We have, D2t+1 ≤
∥∥u¯∗t+1 − pi(u¯∗t )∥∥2, and
since u¯∗t+1 =
t
t+1
u¯∗t +
1
t+1
u∗t+1, and D2t = ‖u¯∗t − pi(u¯∗t )‖2, we have,
D2t+1 ≤
(
t
t+ 1
)2
D2t +
(
2M
t+ 1
)2
+ 2
t
(t+ 1)2
〈
u¯∗t − pi(u¯∗t ), u∗t+1 − pi(u¯∗t )
〉
.
It follows that for each t, D2t+1 ≤
(
t
t+1
)2
D2t +
(
2M
t+1
)2, the inequality being obvious when
Dt+1 = 0. A simple induction argument then gives, D2t ≤ (2M)2/t, which implies that,
max{u¯∗j,t − (vj − 10ε), 0} ≤
(∑
j
(
max{u¯∗j,t − (vj − 10ε), 0}
)2)1/2 ≤ 2M/√t,
as desired. 
A direct consequence is that we can choose T large enough so that the average payoff
u¯∗j,T is no more than vj − 9ε. A one-shot deviation by player j thus entails an average
payoff less than or equal to vj − 9ε over the punishment phase.
Thanks to the one-shot deviation principle (see e.g. Mailath and Samuelson (2006),
Proposition 7.1.1., page 231), it is enough to check that no player has an incentive to
deviate at a single stage and conform with the strategy afterwards. Since the strategy
prescribes only admissible action profiles, a deviation that does not affect the public signal
is not profitable. We may thus focus on detectable deviations.
Deviation from the main phase. Consider a one-shot deviation from some player j
in the normal phase NORM(vj) at some stage t∗ and assume that player j deviates to
yj such that f(yj, x−j,t∗(σ)) 6= f(xt∗(σ)). Recall that we consider one-shot deviations, so
player j does not expect any further deviation, hence the punishment phase is composed
of only one punishment block of length P = QT , and of the compensation block. Player
j’s discounted payoff normalized at the stage of the deviation is thus at most :
A := (1− δ)M + δ(1− δP )rj(DPk)
+δP+1(1− δC)
[
1− δP+C
δP (1− δC) (vj − 9ε)− zj(DPk)
]
+ δP+C+1vj
= (1− δ)M + δ(1− δP+C)(vj − 9ε) + δP+C+1vj.
If player j conforms with the strategy, his payoff is at least B := −(1− δT )M + δTvj,
where the first term is there because the deviation may occur in the middle of a cycle of
the normal phase. Now,
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A−B = (1− δ)M + δ(1− δP+C)(vj − 9ε) + (δP+C+1 − δT )vj + (1− δT )M
= (1− δ)
[
M +
δ(1− δP+C)
1− δ (vj − 9ε) +
δP+C+1 − δT
1− δ vj +
(1− δT )
1− δ M
]
= (1− δ)
[
M +
δ(1− δP+C)
1− δ (−9ε) +
δ(1− δT−1)
1− δ vj +
(1− δT )
1− δ M
]
The limit of (A−B)/(1− δ) as δ → 1 is then:
D := M + (P + C)(−9ε) + (T − 1)vj + TM.
Dividing by P + C, we get:
D/(P + C) =
(T + 1)M + (T − 1)vj
P + C
− 9ε.
We may now tune the length of blocks T and of the punishment phase P + C, in such a
way that this expression is negative. It is enough to choose P +C large with respect to T
and M , to ensure D/(P + C) ≤ −8ε. For this choice of the parameters, δ can be chosen
large enough so that A − B < −ε. The discounted payoff can then differ by at most α
from the discounted sum of average payoffs over blocks. With α << ε, the deviation is
not profitable for high enough δ.
Deviation from a punishment block. Assume that a punishment phase is going with
current punishment block Pk, k > 0 (recall that Pk consists of Q blocks of stages of length
T ). We consider two types of players: first, the players in DPk that will not be rewarded
(i.e. the set of suspected players during block Pk), second the players in J := N \ DPk .
The main difference is that for players j ∈ DPk , the maximal payoffs u∗j considered in the
punishment phase, upper bound their actual payoff. The approachability strategy ensures
that all players that could be responsible for the deviation are actually punished. Since
the signal do not discriminate between them, they all have to be treated the same way
and in particular, not to be offered rewards (otherwise, that would created incentives to
trigger the punishment). By contrast, for players j in J , the maximal payoffs u∗j need not
coincide with their actual payoff. Also, in each case, we need to focus on two subcases: a
deviation might already have occurred in the current block, or not.
1. First case, consider j ∈ DPk .
(a) Suppose first that there has been no deviation in block Pk so far.
If player j deviates at block q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} in block Pk, then he may profit
from the deviation for the remaining stages of block q. For the Q−q remaining
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blocks of block Pk, he gets a payoff, denoted byW thereafter, which is the same
as if he had not deviated. After block Pk, he has to go through an additional
punishment block Pk+1, before starting the compensation block then the reward
phase. His discounted payoff normalized at the beginning of block q (given that
player j deviates) is thus at most:3
A := (1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(Q−q)T )W
+δT+(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
[
vj −
(
9 +
1
P
)
ε
]
+δT+(Q−q)T+P+Cvj.
If player j conforms, his discounted payoff is at least:
B := −(1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(Q−q)T )W
+δT+(Q−q)T (1− δC)
[
1− δP+C
δP (1− δC) (vj − 9ε)−
1− δP
δP (1− δC)rj(DPk)
]
+δT+(Q−q)T+Cvj.
Now,
A−B = (1− δT )2M − δT+(Q−q)T 1− δ
P
δP
vj + δ
T+(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)(−9ε− ε
P
)
−δT+(Q−q)T (1− δC)
[
1− δP+C
δP (1− δC) (−9ε)−
1− δP
δP (1− δC)rj(DPk)
]
.
The limit of (A−B)/(1− δ) as δ → 1 is then:
= 2TM − Pvj + (P + C)(−9ε− ε
P
)− (P + C)(−9ε)
+Prj(DPk)
= 2TM − Pvj − (P + C) ε
P
+ Prj(DPk).
Dividing by P , we get:
D/(P + C) =
2TM
P
− vj − P + C
P
ε
P
+ rj(DPk).
By Claim A.1, rj(DPk) ≤ vj − 9ε so that rj(DPk)− vj ≤ −9ε. Hence,
D/(P + C) ≤ 2TM
P + C
− ε
P
− P
P + C
9ε.
3Given that player j deviates at block q, he should do so at the beginning of block q in order to
maximize the potential gain of his deviation, since he may then profit from it for the remaining T stages
of block q.
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Similarly as in the previous case, choosing P + C large with respect to T and
M , ensures that the right-hand-side is negative, and therefore the deviation is
not profitable for δ large enough.
(b) Suppose now that there have been m deviations in block Pk so far, with 0 <
m < P , the last one at stage tm.
If player j deviates at block q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} in block Pk, then he may profit
from the deviation for the remaining stages of block q. As in the previous
case, for the Q − q remaining blocks of block Pk, he gets a payoff W which
is the same as if he had not deviated. After block Pk, he has to go through
an additional punishment block Pk+1, before starting the compensation block
then the reward phase. His discounted payoff normalized at the beginning of
block q is thus at most:
A := (1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(Q−q)T )W
+δT+(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
[
vj −
(
9 +
m
P
)
ε
]
+δT+(Q−q)T+P+Cvj.
Regarding player j’s payoff if he conforms, two cases are possible. First, j ∈
D(xtm , stm), hence player j is a potential deviator of the last deviation at stage
tm. Player j’s payoff if he conforms is then at least:
B := −(1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(Q−q)T )W
+δT δ(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
[
vj −
(
9 +
m− 1
P
)
ε
]
+δT+(Q−q)T+P+Cvj.
Now,
A−B = (1− δT )2M − δT+(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
(
− ε
P
)
.
The limit of (A−B)/(1− δ) as δ → 1 is then:
D := 2TM − (P + C)
(
− ε
P
)
.
Dividing by P + C, we get:
D/(P + C) =
2TM
P + C
− ε
P
.
In that case, choosing C large with respect to P , T and M , ensures that the
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deviation is not profitable for δ large enough.
Second, suppose that player j is not in D(xtm , stm), that is player j is not
suspected as a potentiel deviator at stage tm. Player j’s payoff if he conforms
is then at least:
B′ := −(1− δT )M
+δT
[
(1− δ(Q−q)T )W + δ(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)vj
]
+δT+(Q−q)T+P+C(vj + ρ).
Now,
A−B′ = (1− δT )2M + δT+(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
(
−9ε− m
P
ε
)
−δT+(Q−q)T+P+Cρ.
The limit of A−B′ as δ → 1 is then −ρ, thus for δ large enough, the deviation
is not profitable.
2. Second case, player j ∈ J = N \DPk.
(a) Suppose first that there has been no deviation in block Pk so far.
If player j deviates at block q ∈ {1, . . . , Q} in block Pk, then he may profit
from the deviation for the remaining stages of block q. For the Q−q remaining
blocks of block Pk, he gets a payoff W (the same as if he had not deviated).
After block Pk, he has to go through an additional punishment block Pk+1,
before starting the compensation block then the reward phase. His discounted
payoff normalized at the beginning of block q (given that player j deviates) is
thus at most:
A := (1− δT )M
+δT
[
(1− δ(Q−q)T )W + δ(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
(
vj −
(
9 +
1
P
)
ε
)]
+δT+(Q−q)T+P+Cvj.
If player j conforms, his discounted payoff is at least:
B := −(1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(Q−q)T )W
+δT+(Q−q)T (1− δC)
[
1− δP+C
δP (1− δC)vj −
1− δP
δP (1− δC)rj(DPk)
]
+δT+(Q−q)T+C(vj + ρ).
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Now,
A−B = (1− δT )2M + δT+(Q−q)T (1− δP+C)
(
vj −
(
9 +
1
P
)
ε
)
−δT+(Q−q)T (1− δC)
[
1− δP+C
δP (1− δC)vj −
1− δP
δP (1− δC)rj(DPk)
]
−δT+(Q−q)T+C(1− δP )vj − δT+(Q−q)T+Cρ.
As in the previous case, the limit of A − B′ as δ → 1 is −ρ and for δ large
enough, the deviation is not profitable.
(b) Suppose now that there have been m deviations in block Pk so far, with 0 <
m < P , the last one at stage tm.
This is similar to case 1.(b) above. Indeed, whether player j is punished at
block Pk or not, his potential gain from deviating only depends on the fact
that he was suspected (or not) at the last deviation (which happened at stage
tm).
Deviation from the compensation phase. If player j deviates at block r ∈ {1, . . . , R}
of the compensation block COMP(nk−1,DPk), then he may profit from the deviation for
the remaining stages of block r. For the R − r remaining blocks of the compensation
block, he gets a payoff W (as before, the same as if he had not deviated). After the
compensation block, he has to go through a new punishment block P1, before starting a
new compensation block then the reward phase. His discounted payoff normalized at the
beginning of block r is thus at most:
A := (1− δT )M
+δT
[
(1− δ(R−r)T )W + δ(R−r)T (1− δP+C) (vj − 9ε)
]
+δT+(R−r)T+P+Cvj.
Regarding player j’s payoff if he conforms, two cases are possible. First, suppose that
j ∈ DPk , his discounted payoff is then:
B := −(1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(R−r)T )W + δT+(R−r)Tvj.
Now,
A−B = (1− δT )2M − δT+(R−r)T (1− δP+C)(−9ε).
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The limit of (A−B)/(1− δ) as δ → 1 is then:
D := 2TM + (P + C)(−9ε).
Dividing by P + C, we get:
D/(P + C) =
2TM
P + C
− 9ε.
As in previous cases, choosing P + C large with respect to T and M ensures that the
deviation is not profitable for large δ.
Second, suppose that player j ∈ J = N \DPk . His discounted payoff if he conforms is
then:
B := −(1− δT )M + δT (1− δ(R−r)T )W + δT+(R−r)T (vj + ρ),
which is strictly more than the previous case, hence the deviation is not profitable either.
Deviation from the reward phase. Suppose that player j deviates during a reward
phase. Two cases are possible. First, take player j ∈ DPk with Pk the last punishment
block. Then, player j’s discounted payoff if he conforms during the reward phase is vj.
The situation is similar the main phase, and and deviation is not profitable for choices
of parameters and discount factors as in previous cases. Second, if player j /∈ DPk , then
his discounted payoff is vj + ρ, which is more than in the previous case, so for the same
choice of parameters and a high discount factor, the deviation is not profitable either.
To conclude, this strategy is an equilibrium for the following choice of the parameters:
Q and R large enough so that P + C large with respect to both T and M , and R large
enough so that C is large with respect to P . This ends the proof of Theorem 3.12. 
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